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CRIMINAL LAW
John S. Baker, Jr.*
THE DEFINITION AND PROOF OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Traditionally, the scope of appellate review of criminal convictions
on matters of guilt or innocence has been rather restricted in Louisiana
due to state constitutional provisions' and the broad language of the
Criminal Code which leaves most issues to be resolved by the jury as
questions of fact. Louisiana law has been displaced in part by fourteenth
amendment due process standards which require appellate courts to review
whether the evidence has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' State
v. Shapiro3 provides an alternate basis for an enlarged scope of appellate
review. This alternate basis is premised not on any federal or state con-
stitutional standard, but on the statutory basis of the circumstantial
evidence rule, contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:438.4 The cir-
cumstantial evidence standard of review, because it involves the reversal
of convictions for insufficient evidence when the evidence is nevertheless
constitutionally sufficient, is likely to accelerate a legislative trend of
redefining crimes to eliminate difficult to prove elements, especially the
mental requirements of criminal conduct.
In Jackson v. Virginia,5 a state habeas corpus case, the United States
Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment requires federal courts to review state convictions to determine
whether the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
As a result of Jackson, Louisiana was required to abandon its appellate
review standard, which had affirmed convictions if there was "some
evidence" to support the verdict.' Jackson, however, did not require, and
indeed declined to adopt a rule, that in cases of circumstantial evidence,
the prosecution be held to a standard of excluding every hypothesis ex-
cept that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'
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1. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(C).
2. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
3. 431 So. 2d 373, 378 (La. 1982) (on rehearing).
4. LA. R.S. 15:438 provides: "The rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming every
fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."
5. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
6. State v. Matthews, 375 So. 2d 1165 (La. 1979).
7. Only under a theory that the prosecution was under an affirmative duty to
rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could
this petitioner's challenge be sustained. That theory the Court has rejected in the
past. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 . . . . We decline to adopt
it today.
443 U.S. at 326.
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Since Jackson, the Louisiana Supreme Court has had difficulty relating
the constitutionality required reasonable doubt standard and the Loui-
siana circumstantial evidence rule which previously only affected the trial
of the case.' In State v. Austin,9 the court read the due process standard
and Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:438 together."0 Then in State v.
Graham," the court backed away from merging these standards.' 2 In
Shapiro, the court formalized the distinction between these standards, con-
cluding that while proof may have been sufficient to satisfy section 438.
The court in Shapiro held that "there [was] no direct proof that the defen-
dant fired the weapon or that he did so with an intent to kill."' 3 The
court said "the state had to exclude the defense's suggested hypothesis
of an intentional suicide or an accidental firing by the victim while
threatening suicide." 4 In this case, which came down to a question of
"who fired the gun," the court found the forensic evidence
"inconclusive." 5 Regarding other evidence, the court rejected a state ex-
pert's testimony, stating it "does not have a 'legitimate tendency to com-
pel belief in [nor to compel] a finding of defendant's guilt;' nor does
his testimony 'tend to prove' defendant's guilt exclusively."' 6 Moreover,
the court determined the testimony was countered by other expert
8. LA. R.S. 15:438 (1981).
9. 399 So. 2d 158 (La. 1981).
10. Regarding circumstantial evidence, R.S. 15:438 sets forth the rule that, in order
to convict, the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
Under Jackson, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the piosecu-
tion and from the viewpoint of a rational trier of fact. Therefore, when we review
a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence we must determine that, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of
fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence had been excluded.
Id. at 160.
11. 422 So. 2d 123 (La. 1982).
12. In previous opinions we have attempted to formulate a single precept in-
corporating both standards. See, e.g., State v. Austin, 399 So.2d 158 (La.1981).
. . . Upon further reflection, however, a merger does not appear to promote
clarity but could lead to a distortion of the standards. A combination of the rules
may incorrectly imply that, when all of the evidence of the defendant's guilt is
circumstantial, due process requires more than evidence which would satisfy any
rational juror of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand,
an in-tandem articulation may seem improperly to diminish the requirement of
the circumstantial evidence rule by implying that, in a close case, this court will
defer to the jury's finding rather than follow its own determination of whether
there is a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Although in many instances separate
and dual applications of the rules will yield the same result, out of an abundance
of caution we will proceed to apply each standard separately, as it was given
to us by the framers.
Id. at 129.
13. 431 So. 2d at 385.
14. Id. at 386.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 387 (quoting Kassin v. United States, 87 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 1937)).
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testimony. Finally, discounting "the best part of the state's case," name-
ly discrepancies in statements made by the defendant, the court "con-
clude[d] that the state did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that [the
victim's] death resulted from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. '"'7
In reviewing the record for sufficiency of evidence, a question of law,
the court is not able to make credibility choices concerning witnesses whose
demeanor they have had no opportunity to observe. The standard in
Shapiro, however, involves the court in second guessing the credibility
choices made by the jury. This second guessing is neither required nor
authorized by Jackson. According to Jackson, a "court faced with a record
of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume-
even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record-that the trier of
fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must
defer to that resolution."' 8 While Jackson "does not require a court to
'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt,""' 9 Shapiro in effect does do so by requir-
ing the appellate court, not only the jury, to be convinced to a "moral
certainty. " 20
The court justifies its weighing of the evidence as required by the
circumstantial evidence rule and as supported by two cases, one federal
and one state. Not only is the federal case not controlling, but the prac-
tice in federal courts does not support the broad ranging review justified
in Shapiro." The state case, State v. Gould," which approved a jury charge
from a much earlier case, is noteworthy, not for the substance of the
jury charge, but for the court's assumption that the "moral certainty"
provision applies to an appellate court as it does to a jury. Although
the statute governing circumstantial evidence is not by its terms limited
to trial, it does not necessarily follow that the statute applies on appeal. 3
Shapiro and Gould assume without discussion that the circumstantial
evidence rule does apply on appeal. The Shapiro court stated that "[tihe
17. Id. at 388.
18. 443 U.S. at 326.
19. Id. at 318-19 (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966)).
20. 431 So. 2d at 387 (quoting State v. Jefferson, 43 La. Ann. 995, 996, 10 So. 199,
200 (1891)); see also id. at 389 (Lemmon, J. concurring).
21. Shapiro, 431 So. 2d at 387 (citing Ah Ming Cheng v. United States, 300 F.2d 202
(5th Cir. 1962)). The concurring opinion in Jackson, however, points out that in practice
very few federal convictions are overturned on grounds of insufficient evidence. 443 U.S.
at 328-29 (Stevens, J., concurring).
22. 395 So. 2d 647, 654 (La. 1981) (on rehearing).
23. Justice Stevens, concurring in Jackson, disputed the logic of requiring a reviewing
court to apply the same reasonable doubt standard as applied by the jury. 443 U.S. at
334. Although not persuaded by this argument insofar as the reasonable doubt standard
is concerned, the majority did not go so far as to require a reviewing court to apply the
circumstantial evidence standard even if applied by the jury. Id. at 326. Justice Stevens'
point, therefore, remains relevant to the question of whether the circumstantial evidence
rule applied at trial should necessarily apply on review.
19831
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Louisiana legislature has, through [Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:438], pro-
vided greater protection against erroneous convictions based on circumstan-
tial evidence than is provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. '24 This state-
ment, however, is divorced from context. The Louisiana legislature has
also provided a limited scope of appellate review, 25 which had to give
way in the face of Jackson. For the court to use section 438 to expand
the scope of appellate review beyond Jackson is in accord with neither
legislative intent nor the state constitution which reflects a design to leave
fact-finding to juries. 26 Indeed, the legislature has expressed its attitude
toward judicial interference with the jury's function by eliminating the
directed verdict as one way to curtail the discretion of both trial and ap-
pellate courts to override a jury's verdict.2"
Due process standards require appellate courts to reverse those rela-
tively few convictions in which adequate proof has not been produced.
Under the former "no evidence" standard and because of the lack of
a directed verdict, the appellate courts' role may have been too limited.
As a result, the supreme court may have found "no evidence" in a few
cases in which there was "some evidence," or have reversed on other
technicalities where it was actually concerned about the sufficiency of the
evidence. With the application of the due process standard of Jackson,
the court has sufficient means for reversing truly unjust convictions.
Beyond that, the court is neither required nor authorized to extend its
review, contrary to its assertion in Shapiro that it is "constrained in a
case of this sort by Louisiana law of long standing." 2 8 Moreover, the
courts intrusion on the jury's role as fact finder, which was operative
even before Shapiro,29 appears to have prompted an overreaction from
the legislature in an attempt to curtail what may be perceived to be an
abuse of appellate review.
The weighing of circumstantial evidence by an appellate court can
have a substantial impact on the proof of intent if the court regularly
refuses to accept inferences and credibility choices made by the jury. In-
tent "need not be proven as a fact, [but] it may be inferred from the
circumstances of the transaction." 3 Indeed, specific intent often cannot
24. 431 So. 2d at 384 (quoting State v. Lenon Williams, 423 So. 2d 1048, 1052 (La.
1982)).
25. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(C); see, e.g., State v. Thompson, 366 So. 2d 1291 (La.
1978); State v. Williams, 354 So. 2d 152 (La. 1977).
26. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(C).
27. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 778. The legislature later provided a motion for a post-
verdict judgment of acquittal in order to implement Jackson. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 821;
see State v. Lenon Williams, 423 So. 2d 1048, 1053 n.1 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
28. 431 So. 2d at 388.
29. See, e.g., State v. Ricks, 428 So. 2d 794 (La. 1983); State v. Graham, 422 So.
2d 123 (La. 1982).
30. LA. R.S. 15:445 (1981).
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be proven by direct evidence such as a confession. Rather, the prosecu-
tion must prove specific intent through circumstantial evidence, which re-
quires the jury to make common sense inferences. A jury's inferences
routinely rest on judgments about the credibility of the witnesses. The
jury must, in a case of circumstantial evidence, exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of guilt. In all cases, whether based on circumstantial evidence
or otherwise, the jury must be convinced to a "moral certainty," as often
instructed by the court in explaining proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'
The court of appeal, with only a written record, is not in a position to
review such credibility choices. Thus, a court might not be convinced to
a "moral certainty" in some cases even though it was unreasonable for
the jury to have been convinced to a moral certainty. Under the Shapiro
standard, however, the court unavoidably gets involved in weighing the
evidence and making choices about the jury's judgment on credibility.
Quite apart from the merits of the court's view of the facts in Shapiro,32
this standard will result in the reversal of convictions, based on evidence
which satisfied both a jury and the constitutional standards, which can-
not be retried due to double jeopardy provisions. 3
A perception that the court is reversing constitutionally sufficient con-
victions apparently has prompted the legislature to loosen the requirements
for intent. In its last session, the legislature substituted the term "tak-
ing" for the theft requirement of armed robbery."' This eliminated the
requirement of proof of intent "to permanently deprive." The author of
the bill was concerned about proving armed robbery where a defendant
discards the thing taken shortly after the "robbery." Under such cir-
cumstances, the defendant might argue that his action constituted only
unauthorized use of a movable coupled with a weapon, rather than theft
coupled with a weapon. In the course of making this change, however,
the legislature also unwittingly eliminated the intent to steal." Arguably,
31. See State v. Jefferson, 43 La. Ann. 995, 10 So. 199 (1891).
32. All the justices concurred in the judgment in Shapiro.
33. 431 So. 2d at 389.
34. 1983 La. Acts, No. 70, § 1, amending CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:64(A) (1974).
The amendment provides: "Armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging
to another from the person of another or which is in the immediate control of another,
by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon."
35. Whether Louisiana's new theft article contains an "intent to steal" might be debated.
The definition of theft in LA. R.S. 14:67 does include the "intent to deprive the other
permanently." This way of formulating the intent is said to equate with the "intent to
steal." See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 637 (1972). Whether
or not the phrase "intent to deprive" in LA. R.S. 14:67 equates to, or includes, an intent
to steal, the statute as a whole must be read to include the intent to steal, as evident from
the mistake of fact defense. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:16 (1974). Suppose, for instance,
a defendant takes property believing the property to be his. It is possible under such cir-
cumstances for the property to be in the possession of another and for the defendant to
take the property, believing it to be his and, therefore, intending to deprive the other per-
manently of possession. Although the thing taken belongs to another, there is no intent
1983]
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therefore, the legislature has made it an armed robbery for a person to
collect a debt or otherwise reclaim his property by using a gun. While
use of a gun is unlawful for such purposes and should be punished as
aggravated assault, the action of taking or reclaiming what one reasonably
thinks is his, previously appeared not to be an armed robbery.3 6
The legislature may justifiably be concerned about the supreme court's
reversal of some cases, but the legislature's elimination of intent from
the definition of crimes traditionally requiring a mens rea is unjustified.
A mental element or mens rea is generally essential to the definition of
criminal conduct.37 The often cited statement by the United States Supreme
Court in Morissette v. United States3" says it well:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is
as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty
of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A rela-
tion between some mental element and punishment for a harmful
act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But
I didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy
and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place
of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public pro-
secution. Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English com-
mon law in the Eighteenth Century was indicated by Blackstone's
sweeping statement that to constitute any crime there must first
be a "vicious will.''
39
Unfortunately, in the tug-of-war which may be occurring between the
court and the legislature over how much proof is sufficient for a convic-
tion, the process of defining crime suffers. The court cannot define crime,
but its procedural and evidentiary decisions can make the proof of cer-
tain crimes more difficult. If the legislature feels strongly enough, it may
react by eliminating the difficult-to-prove element or creating a new crime
without that element. If the eliminated element is intent, the court's well-
intentioned attempt to assure adequate proof actually has the effect of
to steal under those circumstances. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra at 638, 641. If the
defendant has made a reasonable mistake of fact regarding his claim of right to the prop-
erty, his action will not constitute theft. See CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:16, reporter's
comment (1974).
36. See State v. Randolph, 275 So. 2d 174 (La. 1973). It might be thought that the
amended armed robbery statute would not conflict with Randolph because it retains a re-
quirement of "belonging to another." In mistake of fact or claim of right situations, however,
the issue is not whether it does in fact belong to another, but whether the defendant intends
to take that which he knows belongs to another and not to himself.
37. State v. Brown, 389 So. 2d 48 (La. 1980).
38. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
39. Id. at 250-51 (footnotes omitted).
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promoting an erosion of the principle of mens rea, the very principle which
the proof requirement was designed to protect and which the supreme
court has recognized as generally required for criminal conduct.
The legislature, during the past session, not only eliminated the in-
tent of theft from armed robbery, but also created a new burglary-like
statute, without the intent for burglary. These developments are ill-
considered responses prompted in part by the legislature's perception that
the supreme court is overturning legitimate convictions. The legislature,
however, has available alternatives other than eliminating intent re-
quirements from the definition of crimes. To legislatively repeal the rule
of Shapiro would not only be more defensible, but also more efficient
because curtailing the opportunity for reversal of convictions on eviden-
tiary grounds would minimize the instances in which the legislature would
be urged to redefine particular crimes on an ad hoc basis. The legislature
could eliminate the application of the circumstantial evidence rule as a
standard for review on appeal, while maintaining the rule as applicable
at trial. The legislature would thereby codify the standard articulated in
Jackson, including its rejection for purposes of appeal of the "theory
that the prosecution [is] under an affirmative duty to rule out every
hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.""0
BURGLARY
Three cases, State v. Ricks," State v. Jones,"2 and State v. Pike,"3
which involved completed or attempted burglaries, indicate how prob-
lematic the proof of burglary has become under the state supreme court's
application of Jackson v. Virginia." The difference between Ricks and
Jones, which reverse convictions, and Pike, which affirms one, seems to
be whether the court agrees with the fact finder's weighing of the evidence
and credibility choices, particularly on the issue of intent.
The court in Ricks reversed a conviction of attempted simple burglary
of an inhabited dwelling." Shortly after midnight, the defendant attemp-
ted to enter an apartment by breaking the screen door latch. The occu-
pant called out to the intruder with a warning that he would shoot. When
Ricks responded with a profane negative and continued his advance, the
occupant shot the defendant in the leg. Ricks fled and hid in a neighbor-
40. 443 U.S. at 325-26.
41. 428 So. 2d 794 (La. 1983).
42. 426 So. 2d 1323 (La. 1983).
43. 426 So. 2d 1329 (La. 1983).
44. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
45. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:62.2 (Supp. 1983). It provides in pertinent part:
Simple burglary of an inhabited home is the unauthorized entry of any inhabited
dwelling, house, apartment or other structure used in whole or in part as a home
or place of abode by a person or persons with the intent to commit a felony
or any theft therein, other than as set forth in Article 60.
19831
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ing building. Ricks testified that he had been drinking; he went to visit
a friend who lived in the same apartment, and, after knocking loudly
and calling her name, was shot when he started to leave. The friend ad-
mitted she had known Ricks for about a year, but denied that he had
ever been in the apartment. Nevertheless, the court reversed the jury's
finding of guilt, stating that the "evidence introduced by the state [did]
not exclude reasonable hypotheses that the defendant intended to commit
a misdemeanor or intended a social visit as he asserted."" 6 Justice Lem-
mon dissenting, and inferentially also Justice Marcus dissenting, charged
the majority with distorting the Jackson standard by "ignor[ing] the ra-
tional juror element." 7
Ricks cited the court's earlier reversal of an attempted burglary con-
viction in State v. Jones," ' a case in which evidence of intent where no
property was missing and no burglary tools were present was held to be
insufficient. Jones had been in a neighbor's bedroom at midnight and
refused to identify himself. He had previously been treated for mental
illness and contended he was in the neighbor's bedroom seeking someone
to drive him to the hospital. The court cited this contention as the basis
for reversal on an "evidentiary insufficiency, ' i.e., a lack of proof that
the defendant had the intent to commit a felony or theft. Here, too, Justice
Lemmon dissented because the court was crediting testimony of the defen-
dant rejected by the jury.
State v. Pike,50 decided the same day as Jones and later cited
by Ricks as an example of a case in which there had been suf-
ficient evidence of intent for burglary, affirmed a burglary convic-
tion without adverting to a possible issue regarding the legal sufficiency
of the evidence. The defendant was discovered hiding in a neighbor's closet
at 2:30 A.M. Claiming he and his neighbors enjoyed a mutual "open
house" policy, he said he had come to "borrow" some marijuana from
his neighbor." The trial judge credited, and the appellate court accepted,
the occupant's testimony that the defendant's entry was unauthorized.
Regarding the issue of intent, however, there seemed to have been no
question that the defendant was looking for marijuana, and he apparently
had some reasonable basis for believing that the marijuana was present
in the dwelling. The court focused on the circumstances surrounding the
entry and the intent to take the marijuana as providing sufficient evidence
of intent to commit a theft. 2
46. 428 So. 2d at 796.
47. Id. at 798.
48. 426 So. 2d 1323 (La. 1983).
49. Id. at 1327.
50. 426 So. 2d 1329 (La. 1983).
51. Id. at 1332-33.
52. Id. at 1333.
[Vol. 44
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Without discussing the issue, the court apparently assumed that an
intent to take contraband is sufficient to prove an intent to commit a
theft." The intent of burglary, which must exist at the the point of entry,
is a specific intent either to commit a felony or theft therein."4 The defen-
dant need not intend to steal any particular item to have the requisite
intent to commit a theft. 5 If, however, the defendant's only intent is
to take contraband, whether he has the specific intent of theft, i.e., to
take "anything of value which belongs to another" is debatable. The
definition of "anything of value," a term chosen to avoid the historical
difficulties of the term "property," is so broad that it would seem to
include contraband. 6 As contraband, however, marijuana does not
"belong" to the person who happens to possess it. Although the object
of the theft need not belong to the person from whom it is taken for
purposes of theft"1 (e.g., a thief may be guilty of theft from another thief),
the issue arises as to whom does contraband belong for purposes of theft.
The weight of case authority from other jurisdictions is that the taking
of contraband is nevertheless larceny." Presumably, the taking of contra-
band with an intent to deprive should also constitute theft in Louisiana,
and the requirement that it "belong to another" could be satisfied by
arguing the contraband belongs to the state. The point, for present pur-
poses, is that because the marijuana can not belong to the occupants,
the defendant might have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of
intent, as a matter of law, without questioning the factual findings.
While the defendant appears to have been properly convicted, the case
can be instructive on the question of what is necessary to constitute a
"question of law" for purposes of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
on appeal." As framed by this writer, the question of law in Pike on
the issue of intent might have been considered without reconsideration
of the fact findings. This type of review of the sufficiency of the evidence
53. In the instant case the defendant admitted that he was in his neighbors' home
for the purpose of looking for drugs. The state contends that the only reason
defendant was present in the house was to commit a theft ...
... Defendant admitted to the police that he was looking for a joint in the house.
Id.
54. LA. R.S. 14:62 states in pertinent part: "Simple burglary is the unauthorized enter-
ing . . . with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein .... ." LA. R.S. 14:62.2
states in pertinent part: "Simple burglary of an inhabited home is the unauthorized entry
. . . with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein .... "
55. LA. R.S. 14:62 and 14:62.2 require only the intent to commit "any theft."
56. See CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:2(2), :67 & reporter's comments (1974).
57. State v. McClanahan, 262 La. 138, 262 So. 2d 499 (1972).
58. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 35, at 634; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW 1085 (3d ed. 1982).
59. Admittedly legal issues sometimes "masquerad[e] as sufficiency questions." Jackson,
443 U.S. at 329 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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is not all that Jackson requires, however. Jackson requires that the courts
look at all the evidence. What makes such a review a question of law
rather than of fact is that the reviewing court is to view the evidence
"in the light most favorable to the prosecution" and to affirm the con-
viction if "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 60
Admittedly, any distinction between reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, as a question of law, and weighing the evidence, as a question
of fact, is difficult to discern. The writer submits, however, that in Ricks
and Jones the court is not giving sufficient weight to the judgment of
the jury on the issue of intent, which usually must be inferred from the
testimony and is often influenced by the credibility of the witnesses. Cer-
tain claims made by a defendant based on intoxication, mental illness,
or other circumstances may appear plausible on appeal when abstracted
from a trial record. To succumb to the temptation to second guess the
credibility choices and inferences made by the jury creates the impression
that the court is invading the province of the jury and making the task
of proving the defendant's intent in burglary prosecutions too difficult.
The legislature, during the last session, reacted to the reversal of
burglary convictions by creating the crime of "unauthorized entry of an
inhabited dwelling." 6' The new statute resembles the burglary statute
without a specific intent requirement, i.e., the crime is a trespass with
a possible six year prison term. As discussed above, 62 the elimination of
intent from the definition of a basic crime is a predictable, although un-
warranted, response of the legislature to the unnecessary reversal of con-
victions based on the court's application of Jackson. The ultimate result
is that some of the assessment of guilt is transferred from the jury to
the trial judge and then to the appellate court, as the trial judge deter-
mines, for purposes of sentencing, the seriousness of the unauthorized
entry of the inhabited dwelling according to the sentencing guidelines."'
The trial judge will decide sub silentio whether the unauthorized entry
was in the nature of a trespass or of a burglary.
The tendency to eliminate the distinction between trespass and burglary
has been further reinforced by the legislature's passage of the so-called
60. Id. at 319.
61. 1983 La. Acts, No. 285, § 1, adding CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:62.3. It states:
Unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling is the intentional entry by a per-
son without authorization into any inhabited dwelling or other structure belong-
ing to another and used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode by
a person.
Whoever commits the crime . . . shall be fined not more than one thousand
dollars or imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than six years
or both.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
63. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 894.1 (Supp. 1983).
[Vol. 44
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"Shoot-a-Burglar" bill."" While existing legislation already protects
homeowners, and even business owners, in their ability to defend
themselves from burglars,65 the new loosely-worded legislation significantly
and unreasonably enlarges the area in which the homeowner may act.
The legislation appears to justify the killing of any person who makes
"an unlawful entry into [a] dwelling" and who will not leave without
being "compel[led] . .. to leave the premise," although the circumstances
are not and do -not reasonably appear to the occupant to constitute a
burglary (e.g., an estranged spouse returning to retrieve his or her belong-
ings). To the extent the bill might appear to justify the killing of a simple
trespasser, the language goes beyond what the legislature obviously in-
tended, and what reason would allow. On the other hand, the unnecessary
reversal of burglary convictions makes it more difficult to argue against
the wording of such legislation because the court has placed in doubt
what it takes to constitute a burglary and, therefore, what circumstances
might reasonably justify the homeowner in acting in self-defense or defense
of his habitation. Thus, the overbroad definition of the defense of habita-
tion is tied to the new crime of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwell-
ing, which in turn appears to be a reaction to the reversal of constitu-
tionally adequate convictions.
INTENT TO DEFRAUD
The phrase "intent to defraud," which appears in several statutes
but is undefined in the Criminal Code, has proven to be a difficult con-
cept for Louisiana courts.' 6 The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v.
64. 1983 La. Acts, No. 234, § 1 amending CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:20 (1974).
It states:
A homicide is justifiable:
(4) When committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling against a person
who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwelling or who has made
an unlawful entry into the dwelling and the person committing the homicide
reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the entry
or to compel the intruder to leave the premises. The homicide shall be justifiable
even though the person committing the homicide does not retreat from the
encounter.
(Emphasis added).
65. LA. R.S. 14:20(3) provides:
A homicide is justifiaole:
(3) When committed against a person whom one reasonably believes to be likely
to use any unlawful force against a person present in a dwelling or a place of
business while committing or attempting to commit a burglary of such dwelling
or business. The homicide shall be justifiable even though the person does not
retreat from the encounter.
66. See State v. Bias, 400 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981), discussed in Baker, Developments
in the Law, 1981-1982-Criminal Law, 43 LA. L. REV. 361, 361-64 (1982); State v. Baize,
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Raymo 7 held that the defendant's falsifying a signature on a medical
prescription did not constitute attempted forgery because the state pro-
duced no evidence of an intent to injure or prejudice the rights of another.
Although the case does not altogether rule out the possibility of a forgery
conviction for falsifying a prescription, "given the proper factual
setting," 68 the opinion did little to clarify the meaning of intent to defraud
in this or other statutes."9
The majority opinion equated "intent to defraud" with an intent "to
injure or prejudice the rights of another," ° while noting but not resolv-
ing the ambiguity as to whether intent to defraud includes "intent to
injure."' The majority and the dissent apparently disagreed about the
necessary object of the criminal intent, namely whether "the intent to
injure or prejudice" must be directed at a pecuniary interest." Justice
Lemmon said the majority incorrectly limits the intent to an intent to
injure a pecuniary interest." The majority, however, denied having resolved
that issue.7
Neither the majority nor the dissent focused on the more basic ques-
tion regarding intent to defraud. The majority assumed without discus-
sion, and the dissent did not dispute, that the intent to defraud is a general
intent.7" To the contrary, however, commentators have characterized an
385 So. 2d 221 (La. 1980), discussed in Hargrave, Developments in the Law,
1980-1981-Criminal Law, 42 LA. L. REV. 541, 547-48 (1982).
67. 419 So. 2d 858 (La. 1982).
68. Id. at 860.
69. While an intent to defraud is common to several statutes, the object of the intent
will differ because the criminal consequences intended by the defendant differentiate the
harm of one crime from another. Thus, whether a forged prescription is sufficient to prove
an intent to defraud under LA. R.S. 14:72 presents a different issue, in some respects, from
whether a forged prescription proves intent to defraud under LA. R.S. 40:971(B)(l)(b), the
prohibition against obtaining a controlled dangerous substance via a forged prescription.
The forgery statute, as implied in Raymo, does not designate the object of the intent to
defraud. The narcotics statute, on the other hand, specifies the object of the fraud to be
obtaining possession of a controlled dangerous substance. Raymo distinguishes these two
statutes, not in terms of the different objects of the intent, but only by saying that LA.
R.S. 40:971(B)(1)(b) can be proven without proof of an intent to defraud. See also State
v. Mitchell, 421 So. 2d 851 (La. 1982) (upholds a conviction for knowingly obtaining a
controlled substance by using a forged prescription in violation of LA. R.S. 40:971(B)(1)(b);
distinguishes Raymo; Mitchell, 421 So. 2d at 853 n.8).
70. 419 So. 2d at 859.
71. Id. at 859 n.l.
72. Id. at 860 n.2.
73. Id. at 861 (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 860 n.2.
75. The opinion states: "That a general intent to defraud is an essential element of
forgery is evident from the statute and the comment." Id. at 859. The court also gave
a definition of intent which included that for general intent. Id. But see State v. Mitchell,
421 So. 2d 851, 853 n.8 (1982) (distinguishes Raymo, "[b]ecause the indictment charged
defendant under R.S. 40:971, rather than under the general forgery article (R.S. 14:72),
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intent to defraud as a specific intent.76 Moreover, the Criminal Code has
used the words "with an intent to" to denote a specific intent.77 The
court apparently concluded that the statute requires only a general intent
because reference is made in the reporter's comments to a "general in-
tent." In context, however, the comments seem to refer not to the distinc-
tion between general and specific intent, but to the generality of the in-
tent. That is to say, given even a specific intent, the offender need not
have intended to defraud a specific person. The majority's concern that
an overbroad reading of the statute would give too little weight to the
term "with intent to defraud"" is the very reason why the statute should
be read to require a specific intent. If the court had clarified that this
statute does indeed require a specific intent,79 the subsidiary issues regard-
ing the meaning of intent to defraud might have proven to be more readily
resolvable. 80
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Chapman Dodge Center,"1
while reversing a corporation's conviction on narrow factual grounds,
discussed at length the broad difficulties posed by corporate criminal liabil-
ity. An automobile dealership and its owner-president were charged with
multiple counts of theft and convicted on all counts of the lesser crime
of unauthorized use of movables. The dealership had failed to pay state
sales taxes on a number of automobiles which were sold before the agency
closed due to economic conditions in the automobile industry. The evidence
showed not only that the president, who lived out of state and left the
day-to-day management to others, was not aware of the failure to pay
the taxes, but also that he had ordered all taxes paid and, after inquiry,
[and, thereforel the state was not required to prove that defendant acted with a specific
intent to defraud").
76. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 58, at 378-82; see also W. LAFAVE &
A. SCOTT, supra note 35, at 667-68.
77. See CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:11 (1974); cf. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:67
(1974).
78. 419 So. 2d at 861.
79. The defendant was actually convicted of attempted forgery, which does require proof
of a specific intent. See CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:72 (1974).
80. Clarification about "intent to defraud" is needed to avoid conviction in commer-
cial transactions where there is no evidence of intent to defraud as was the case in State
v. Chapman Dodge Center, 428 So. 2d 413 (La. 1983). A corporation and its owner, charged
with theft, were convicted of unauthorized use of movables. The court, citing State v. Bias,
400 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981), concluded that "the state . . . failed to prove any intent . . .
fraudulent or otherwise." 428 So. 2d at 416. Had it been understood that the intent to
defraud is a specific intent, it should have been clear from the facts that the defendants
did not "actively desir[e] the prescribed criminal consequences," as required by LA. R.S.
14:10. The case is discussed in more detail infra text accompanying notes 81-101.
81. 428 So. 2d 413 (La. 1983).
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had been told "all taxes had been paid.""2 The court not only reversed
the president's conviction for lack of any evidence of fraudulent intent,
but also decided: "that since this record reveals no evidence of compli-
city by the officers or the board of directors, explicit or tacit, that the
actions of these managers and/or employees were insufficient to cause
this corporate entity to be guilty of the offense of an unauthorized use
of a movable." 3
Although unable to resolve some basic issues concerning corporate
liability in this case, 4 the court terms the problem "a grave and troubl-
ing one." 5 "These issues have not been generally considered with respect
to corporations in this jurisdiction.""6 Such issues arise because the con-
cept of corporate criminal liability strains the basic general requirement
in criminal law that criminal conduct require a mens rea.8 7 Although a
corporation is "considered as a natural person,"8 8 the analogy to a human
person is limited. As the court stated: "Holding a corporation criminally
responsible for the acts of an employee may be inconsistent with basic
notions of criminal intent, since such a posture would render a corporate
entity responsible for actions which it theoretically had no intent to
commit." 89
Although criminal liability has been extended to corporations, it is
still limited in a number of ways. First, the liability applies primarily to
regulatory or civil offenses.9" Further extensions of corporate criminal
liability have usually required high corporate officers to have actually
known of or been ivolved in the activity." While some jurisdictions have
gone beyond these limitations, the imposition of criminal liability under
such circumstances based on the tort doctrine of respondeat superior "is
revolutionary and inconsistent with the general view in the United States." 92
While a previous case failed to indicate any constraints on corporate
criminal liability,93 Chapman clearly does so.
The question may be raised on what basis would the court be justified
in limiting corporate criminal liability. Article 2(7) of the Criminal Code
defining "person" includes corporations, without qualification on poten-
tial criminal liability.9 ' The court cannot readily resort to a general find-
82. Id. at 415.
83. Id. at 420.
84. Id. at 419.
85. Id. at 417.
86. Id. at 416.
87. Id. at 417; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 58, at 718-21.
88. LA. CIv. CODE art. 427.
89. 428 So. 2d at 417.
90. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 58, at 718-19.
91. Id. at 719-20.
92. See Hargrave, supra note 66, at 546.
93. State v. Main Motors, Inc., 383 So. 2d 327 (La. 1979).
94. See CRIMIbNAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:2, reporter's comments (1974).
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ing of unconstitutionality for corporate criminal liability, given federal
cases to the contrary." The court does note a different attitude towards
corporate criminal liability in Louisiana and other civil law jurisdictions,
which reference might appear to be laying the foundation for Louisiana
criminal jurisprudence different from other states. 6 The comments to Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 14:2, however, state that the "obsolete concept of
Article 443 of the Civil Code that a corporation cannot be guilty of a
crime has been repudiated." 97
Nevertheless, the criminal law clearly cannot apply equally as well
to a corporation as it does to an individual, despite the language of the
Criminal Code. The comments to the Criminal Code, as the court noted,
indicate that the corporation obviously cannot be imprisoned or executed
in punishment for the crime. There are other common sense limitations
on the criminal liability of a corporation for crimes such as rape. Although
the Criminal Code contains no express limitation precluding such liabil-
ity, such acts are generally not thought to be attributable to the corpora-
tion even if committed by an employee during the course of company
business. The same common sense reasons that limit attributing individual
acts to the corporation should also limit the attribution of mental states
to the corporations for purposes of criminal liability. While some states
have attributed mental states to corporations, the concept remains
controversial.' Such attribution seems inconsistent with the requirement
that the prosecution must prove as to each defendant all of the elements
of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The state supreme court
might well take the position that with respect to a corporation the ele-
ment of criminal intent cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Such a decision would complement the court's decision in State v. Brown,"
which "is an important limitation on the legislature's power to establish
strict liability criminal offenses."100
The justification generally given for broad corporate criminal liabil-
ity is deterrence. Arguments supporting this notion are: (1) criminal liability
provides an incentive for corporations to control their agents more closely;
(2) corporations ought not to benefit from the criminal acts of their agents;
and (3) the complexity of modern corporations justifies criminal liability
due to the difficulty of proving the responsibility of a particular individual.
95. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909); United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973).
96. 428 So. 2d at 418-19.
97. Civil Code article 443 which relieved a corporation-of criminal liability was repealed
by Act 43 of 1942.
98. R. PERKINS & R. BoYcE, supra note 58, at 719.
99. 389 So. 2d 48 (La. 1980).
100. See Hargrave, supra note 66, at 541.
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Given that a fine is the only punishment possible for a corporation,
whether criminal liability is the best way to achieve the desired results
in light of the countervailing considerations is questionable. A criminal
prosecution provides the corporation with constitutional protections, in-
cluding the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not available
in a civil proceeding. Moreover, the state could move more quickly in
a civil proceeding, by way of injunction and forfeiture, and upon final
judgment could effect as great or greater a financial impact upon the
corporation in terms of civil damages than it could with a fine. The only
added deterrent associated with criminal conviction is the moral condem-
nation it carries. Moral condemnation, however, based as it is on the
notion of individual culpability, is not justified for an artificial entity com-
posed of many individuals who are not in fact personally culpable for
any crime.
The reason for limiting corporate criminal liability does not reflect
a bias in favor of corporations but rather a special concern to protect
human persons. Admittedly, one of the arguments for using corporate
criminal liability is to protect the individual employee from prosecution
and conviction by allowing the corporation to be convicted.'' Nevertheless,
the principle of personal responsibility also dictates that if the individual
is personally culpable, he should not be shielded by the corporation. It
may be more often the case, however, that the individual employee is
not in fact personally culpable. Nevertheless, there may be a strong desire
to find someone or something guilty. General acceptance of a policy of
preferring a corporate conviction does not protect the individual because
the policy choice of prosecuting the corporation presumes the guilt of
the employee even if he is not prosecuted since the corporation's guilt
rests on the act and intent of some employee. If the employee is not in
fact guilty because he lacks a mens rea, he may nevertheless suffer some
of the same stigma if the corporation is found guilty. Moreover, the facts
in Chapman serve as a reminder that the decision to prosecute the in-
dividual remains a matter of prosecutorial discretion. In Chapman, the
owner should not have been prosecuted and probably would not have
been prosecuted except jointly with the corporation. Having accepted
without question the concept of corporate criminal liability, the prosecutor
apparently had little problem presuming criminal liability for a corporate
president despite his lack of personal culpability. Broad corporate criminal
liability involves increased acceptance of strict liability for crimes as a
general rule and erosion of the principle of mens rea. Such a develop-
ment inevitably affects not only corporations, but also individuals.
101. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 58, at 719.
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PURSE SNATCHING
State v. Anderson,"°2 construing the crime of "purse snatching,"'
0 3
held that "'snatching' does not require an actual face-to-face confron-
tation."'" 4 The victim, who had been seated at a football game
with her purse on the floor between her legs, testified that she felt a vibra-
tion, looked down, and her purse was gone.' 3 The defendant contended
the term "snatching" was ambiguous and should be read to imply a
physical confrontation. The court observed that the wording of the statute
distinguishes "snatching" from the terms use of force and intimidation.
To equate the word snatching with the phrase use of force, which also
appears in the statute, would eliminate the difference between purse snatch-
ing and simple robbery.0 6 The legislature enacted a special purse snatch-
ing statute because the circumstances of taking a purse often do not in-
volve the use of force or intimidation necessary for simple robbery, but
do subject the person to a form of violence not found in a simple theft.
The court's affirmation without comment of the defendant's sentence
of seven years points up a certain incongruity about the relationship be-
tween simple robbery and purse snatching. Although not a lesser included
offense as such, 0 7 purse snatching contains much of the same wording
as simple robbery and appears to be a less serious crime than simple rob-
bery in the sense that, as discussed above, the crime is provable under
circumstances which may not amount to simple robbery. The legislature,
however, has provided a stiffer penalty for purse snatching than for sim-
ple robbery: whereas simple robbery is punishable with a potential prison
term of up to seven years, purse snatching carries from a mandatory
minimum of two years to a maximum of twenty years. The defendant's
seven-year sentence is within the permissible range for either simple rob-
102. 418 So. 2d 551 (La. 1982).
103. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:65.1 (Supp. 1983). It provides:
A. Purse snatching is the theft of anything of value contained within a purse
or wallet at the time of the theft, from the person of another or which is in
the immediate control of another, by use of force, intimidation, or by snatching,
but not armed with a dangerous weapon.
B. Whoever commits the crime of purse snatching shall be imprisoned, with
or without hard labor, for not less than two years and for not more than twenty
years.
104. 418 So. 2d at 552.
105. Id.
106. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:65 (Supp. 1983). It provides:
Simple robbery is the theft of anything of value from the person of another
or which is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation,
but not armed with a dangerous weapon.
Whoever commits the crime of simple robbery shall be fined not more than
three thousand dollars, imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than
seven years, or both.
107. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 814.
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bery or purse snatching. If a purse snatching defendant were to receive
a sentence exceeding the maximum possible for simple robbery, seven years,
he would seemingly have a good argument that the statutorily permissible
sentence of up to twenty years is excessive when compared to the more
serious crime of simple robbery. Nevertheless, the supreme court has
previously upheld a twenty year sentence for purse snatching."'
Appellate review of sentence, pursuant to article I, section 20 of the
1974 Louisiana Constitution," 9 has been interpreted to permit reversal
of sentences deemed "excessive" though within the statutorily provided
range." 0 As a result, the court has reversed many sentences which are
within the statutorily provided range despite arguments that the constitu-
tional provision should apply only to those cases in which the statute itself
has provided an excessive sentence."' Rarely, however, has the supreme
court declared statutorily provided sentences unconstitutionally excessive.'
The legislatively provided sentence for purse snatching, however, certainly
appears disproportionate, if not "excessive," when compared to that pro-
vided for simple robbery.
Murder-Killing During the Perpetration of a Felony
Both the first and second degree murder statutes punish killings which
occur "[wihen the offender . . . is engaged in the perpetration or attemp-
ted perpetration" of certain felonies." 3 The connection between the kill-
ing and the felony is usually resolved as a question of fact by the jury.'"
Occasionally, the factual connection between the killing and the other crime
108. See State v. Reed, 396 So. 2d 1316 (La. 1981).
109. Article I, section 20 provides in part: "No law shall subject any person . . . to
cruel, excessive or unusual punishment."
110. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979).
11l. See State v. Tilley, 400 So. 2d 1363 (La. 1981); State v. Touchet, 372 So. 2d 1184
(La. 1979); State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979); State v. Goodman, 427 So.
2d 529 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
112. See State v. Goode, 380 So. 2d 1361 (La. 1980) (held LA. R.S. 14:50.1 (mandatory
minimum five-year imprisonment for offenses against the person of someone 65 years of
age or older) unconstitutional as providing an excessive punishment).
113. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1983). It states in pertinent part: "First
degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has specific intent
to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetra-
tion of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated rape, ag-
gravated burglary, armed robbery, or simple robbery.
LA. R.S. 14:30.1 states in pertinent part:
Second degree murder is the'killing of a human being:
(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration
of aggravated rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnap-
ping, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has
no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
114. See State v. Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So. 2d 785 (1948).
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presents a question of law for the court, thus revealing the complexity
of the underlying legal issues. Such is the case of State v. Anthony"5 in
which the court determined that a "homicide occurring during defendant's
flight from the aggravated burglary could be found by the trier of fact
to be first degree murder under R.S. 14:30(l)." '
The court's seemingly simple conclusion was considerably complicated
by the facts and the court's opinion. The supreme court reversed the
district court's quashing of an indictment for first degree murder and
remanded the case for further proceedings. It was undisputed
that Michael Anthony burglarized the apartment . . . located at
710 Park Boulevard; that he left that apartment, went a couple
of blocks and snatched a lady's purge and that he was pursued
and the purse was retrieved. He escaped by going back into the
. . . [same] apartment at which time he armed himself with a
knife. . . . He left the apartment and . . . Miss Summer...
saw him in his attempt to escape and at that time he slashed her
throat and killed her."
7
Three aspects of the opinion deserve comment: (1) the court's
characterization of the pertinent part of the first degree murder statute
as felony murder; (2) the court's determination that the killing occurred
during the perpetration of an aggravated burglary; and (3) the disagree-
ment between the majority and concurring opinions regarding* the scope
and duration of the initial burglary.
The court incorrectly implies that the pertinent provision of first degree
murder is one of felony murder." 8 Although an indictment under the first
section of the first degree murder statute does require proof of one of
the enumerated felonies, which includes aggravated burglary," 9 neither
this nor any part of the first degree murder statute constitutes felony
murder. These same aggravated felonies are listed as elements of that part
of second degree murder which is known as felony murder.'20 The distinc-
tion between the pertinent part of first degree murder and the felony
murder section of second degree murder lies in the element of specific
intent. All forms of first degree murder require specific intent to kill or
115. 427 So. 2d 1155 (La. 1983).
116. Id. at 1159.
117. Id. at 1156-57.
118. R.S. 14:30 defines first degree murder as the "killing of a human being ...
when the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and
is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated . . .
burglary . . ." Aggravated burglary falls expressly within the purview of Loui-
siana's felony murder rule.
Id. at 1157 (emphasis added).
119. See supra note 113.
120. Id.
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to inflict great bodily harm. The felony murder part of second degree
murder, however, requires no such specific intent. Rather, the felony and
its intent supply the mens rea which otherwise would be missing. 2' The
court's likely inadvertent mischaracterization of this case as one of felony
murder has no adverse effect on its ultimate conclusion, but it does pose
the possibility of future confusion regarding the felony murder doctrine.
Both felony murder and the first section of first degree murder re-
quire that the killing occur "[w]hen the offender . . . is engaged in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration" of an enumerated felony. As men-
tioned, however, the requirement of an enumerated felony serves somewhat
different purposes in the two statutes, and therefore, the policies affect-
ing construction of the two statutes may differ. In order to construe the
felony murder provision so that the listed felonies do provide evidence
of a mens rea the killing and the felony should be connected in terms
of legal causation.'22 This suggests some limits to linking the felony and
the killing.' 23 For first degree murder, the felony is an element of the
crime, but it does not substitute for the mens rea; rather, it supplies the
aggravating circumstance which distinguishes first from second degree
murder and which is necessary to justify imposition of the death penalty.'2
While concern for the death penalty may motivate a court to construe
the first degree murder statute narrowly, such concern represents a policy
consideration different from causation issues inherent to felony murder.
Although the rationales for felony murder and first degree murder
may differ, determining whether the killing occurred "[w]hen the offender
• . . [was] engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration" of an
enumerated felony need not differ so long as the construction given is
one that, in the context of felony murder, connects the felony to the kill-
ing in terms of legal causation, i.e., in a way consistent with the principle
of mens rea. Moreover, since second degree murder is responsive to first
degree murder, to give a different construction to the same clause in the
two statutes would be unworkable. Therefore, the court may appropriately
rely on felony murder cases as authority to resolve the issue in a first
degree murder case of whether the killing occurred during the perpetra-
tion or attempted perpetration of the felony."'
The remaining question is whether the court's resolution of the issue
in Anthony creates problems of causation if applied in a true felony murder
121. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 58, at 71.
122. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 257-60 (2d ed. 1960).
123. But see R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 58, at 134 ("The phrase 'committed
in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate,' as it appears in the common type of [felony
murder] statute, has not been narrowly construed.").
124. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (the death penalty cases).
125. State v. West, 408 So. 2d 1302 (La. 1982); State v. Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So.
2d 785 (1948).
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context. This question is best considered by contrasting the majority opin-
ion with the concurring opinion of Justice Blanche. According to both
the majority and concurring opinions, the killing in this case could have
been in the course of the second entry, which may or may not have been
a burglary. There is disagreement, however, on whether the killing could
be said to be in the course of the first burglary. In Justice Blanche's view
"neither the purse snatching, the second entry into the apartment, nor
the homicide fall within the res gestae of the first burglary."' 26 If it is
shown at trial that the defendant made the second entry only to hide,
as he contended, the jury might conclude that the second entry was not
a burglary-although admittedly there was ample evidence for the jury
to conclude that it was indeed an aggravated burglary. If the second en-
try was not a burglary, the killing would constitute first degree murder
only if it occurred during the perpetration of the first burglary and if
that burglary was an aggravated one. The majority's opinion cites the
first burglary as "the indictable event."' 27 Connecting the first burglary
to the killing and overcoming the fact that the first burglary was not ag-
gravated because the defendant apparently did not strike anyone and did
not seize a weapon until the second entry would be accomplished by ap-
plying the res gestae doctrine. As the court noted, this is an evidentiary
doctrine not previously used in Louisiana to analyze the substantive law
of murder.' 28 In terms of the res gestae doctrine, the whole series of qvents
becomes one transaction.
To connect all of these events into a single transaction may be
justifiable for purposes of Louisiana's first degree murder statute, but
to do so would create causation problems in the context of felony murder:
While other jurisdictions have used the "res gestae" concept in felony
murder,'29 the court would have done well to avoid reference to the res
gestae doctrine by limiting itself to analyzing the separate crimes. As stated
by Justice Blanche in his concurring opinion, the second entry provides
a sufficient basis for a jury to conclude that the killing occurred in the
perpetration of an aggravated burglary. While even the killing following
the second entry could raise causation problems, if some of the facts were
different,'30 limiting the construction of "when the offender . . . is engaged
in the perpetration or attempted perpetration" to the second entry would
not itself appear to expand previous Louisiana cases applying this phrase
in the context of felony murder.
126. 427 So. 2d at 1160.
127. Id. at 1158.
128. Id.
129. See R. PERKINS & R. BoYCE, supra note 58, at 135.
130. If there had been an accomplice to the aggravated burglary in Anthony and he
was charged with felony murder under the second degree murder statute, there might have
been an issue whether his actions, following the burglary, were sufficiently related to those
of the killer to justify attributing the action of the killer to the accomplice in the burglary.
See Baker, supra note 66, at 373-74.
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